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Introduction
Nearly fifty years ago, Judge David Bazelon of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declared a “new era” in
the history of what he characterized as the “long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts.”1 Making
this declaration in a case involving the brand new U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Bazelon noted with some disdain that, in
the past, courts had “treated administrative policy decisions with great
deference.”2 But in the purported new era he was celebrating, Bazelon
saw courts using their powers to encourage agencies such as EPA to
make management improvements that might eventually reduce the
†
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the Case Western Reserve Law Review’s symposium on EPA’s fiftieth
anniversary.

1.

Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

2.

Id.
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demand for judicial review.3 He surmised that the very prospect of
judicial review would induce agencies to develop internal standards for
“principled decision-making” that might obviate the need for judicial
scrutiny simply “by enhancing the integrity of the administrative
process.”4
Twenty-five years later, Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit
affirmed Judge Bazelon’s view that, with the beginning of the 1970s,
judicial review of agency action saw an important “rebirth.”5 Following
what she described as “a legislative explosion” in the 1960s and 1970s
centered on social regulation, especially on environmental protection,
“newly formed (or newly energized) public interest lawyers and legal
advocacy groups” started taking the government to court and the
courts “began to subject agency action to much more stringent review.”6
Yet Judge Wald also observed that, by the mid-1980s, the courts’
“uneasy partnership” with the administrative state had shifted
somewhat in the wake of Supreme Court decisions such as Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.—a case
centered on an EPA rulemaking in which the Court took “a more proagency stance for reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is
charged with administering.”7 Rather than judicial scrutiny inducing
internal agency changes that would eventually reduce the importance
of judicial oversight, as Judge Bazelon suggested, Judge Wald saw the
basic tension underlying judicial review of agency action as having
remained “remarkably unchanged” over the years.8 Even Chevron still
gave judges “ample room for intrusive review” at its first step.9
Ultimately, Judge Wald’s view made plain an ever-present role for
judicial review. She forecast that “an unavoidable and irreducible
tension” between judges’ deference to and scrutiny of agencies’
decisionmaking would continue long into the future “no matter how
many procedural alterations and doctrinal shifts we endure.”10
With the passage of another quarter century since Judge Wald’s
observations, it is possible to gain additional insight into whether
judicial review has indeed diminished in importance, as Judge Bazelon
3.

See id. at 598 (stating that judicial review will “confine and control the
exercise of [agency] discretion” in such a way that can encourage agencies
to improve their management processes so as to “diminish the importance
of judicial review”).

4.

Id.

5.

Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership
between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 Tulsa L.J. 221, 228 (1996).

6.

Id. at 224.

7.

Id. at 227.

8.

Id. at 229.

9.

Id. at 228.

10.

Id. at 258.
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implied it would, or whether the courts’ role has remained relatively
unchanged, as suggested by Judge Wald’s account. EPA’s golden
anniversary provides an especially appropriate occasion to reflect on the
history of litigation over EPA rules because the birth and growth of
EPA has coincided with the development of modern administrative law.
With EPA having issued tens of thousands of rules over the last
half-century, it is no surprise that the number of judicial decisions
reviewing EPA rules has grown to such a size that any effort to distill
all of them in a lawyerly fashion would easily fill an entire book.11 We
opt here instead to take an empirical approach, considering what is
known quantitatively about litigation over EPA rules and how the
agency has fared when its rules are subjected to judicial review.
Over the last twenty-five years, a number of quantitative studies
have cast new light on litigation over EPA rules. In this article, we not
only compile and synthesize the findings from these various studies but
also offer new data of our own: the first quantitative comparison of all
EPA rules issued since the agency’s beginning with all appellate
decisions involving EPA. Our aim here is not to distill doctrinal lessons
as much as to offer some empirical observations about rulemaking
litigation over the last fifty years.
These patterns can and do hold doctrinal implications. Based in
part on perceptions that EPA has been besieged with litigation over its
rules, administrative law scholars have argued for legal changes to avoid
the ossification of administrative rulemaking.12 But as we show here,
the sweep of EPA’s history offers an empirical portrait at odds with
such conventional perceptions. Judging from the sheer magnitude of
EPA rules, we see little evidence that rulemaking at the agency has
been ossified. Furthermore, empirical studies reveal little to suggest
that EPA has ever been overwhelmed by litigation challenging its rules.
Perhaps with the exception of the last few years, the agency’s rules
appear remarkably resistant to reversal through litigation.
In the end, the picture is more complex than either Judge Bazelon’s
or Judge Wald’s accounts might suggest. On the one hand, when
considered against the backdrop of a widely held view that the
overwhelming majority of EPA rules are reviewed in court, judicial
review has had less of a presence than widely supposed, as Judge
Bazelon might have expected would occur over time.13 Yet, as Judge
11.

Indeed, other legal scholars have in recent years produced such books
chronicling doctrinal developments in environmental law. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (2004);
Jonathan Z. Cannon, Environment in the Balance: The Green
Movement and the Supreme Court (2015).

12.

See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.

13.

This finding of ours also contrasts with the views advanced by other
scholars, based primarily on doctrinal and qualitative analysis, that
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Wald’s account would imply, a more modest role for litigation over
EPA rules appears to have been established from the outset. We find
stability more than a shift characterizing the data on the last half
century of legal challenges to EPA rules.14 We conclude that EPA and
the courts have reached and sustained a basic equilibrium with each
other throughout the last fifty years. Litigation remains a risk whenever
EPA creates significant rules, but, from its earliest years, the agency
appears to have learned to manage those risks through professional
analysis and internal management processes that have enabled it to
withstand judicial scrutiny to a far greater extent than generally
acknowledged.

I. The Conventional Account of Judicial
Review of EPA Rulemaking
Although much of the early legislation granting EPA authority to
adopt environmental regulations passed with bipartisan support in
Congress, the agency’s implementation of these statutes has been
tagged as adversarial from its earliest days. Political scientist Shep
Melnick’s in-depth case study of the early implementation of the Clean
Air Act planted the seeds of what came to be a conventional scholarly
account of an agency bombarded by litigation and subjected to
intrusive judicial review.15 According to Melnick, the courts in the 1970s
judicial review “receded” to some degree following EPA’s initial decade
and a half. See, e.g., Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA
and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 249, 297 (1991) (asserting that “[j]udicial review has receded in
recent years . . . .”); see id. at 249 (arguing that “[t]he stance of the
federal courts toward the Environmental Protection Agency has changed
substantially during this period” of the agency’s first two decades). Some
quantitative evidence amassed in the wake of Chevron also suggested that
“[a]s the administrative state has matured, courts and the agencies have
come to know one another better; the dictates of administrative law have
become clearer; and agencies have found it less difficult to satisfy
reviewing courts,” Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke
L.J. 984, 1011. But again, we do not see any major or dramatic changes
in the overall frequency of judicial review across the fifty years of EPA’s
operation.
14.

We observe no statistically significant differences in the ratio of appeals
court decisions to EPA rules between EPA’s first quarter century and its
second quarter century. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.

15.

See R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of
the Clean Air Act (1983); see also Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of
Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 41 Admin. L. Rev. 549, 569 (1989)
(suggesting that “[c]ompliance with court orders has become the agency’s
top priority, at times overtaking congressional mandates and threatening
representative democracy”).
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used EPA as a proving ground for a new theory of administrative law,
with judges even sometimes playing a leading role in shaping regulatory
policy.16
There were indeed a number of significant court decisions in EPA
cases from this period: the previously mentioned Environmental
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus,17 with its opinion by Judge Bazelon; the
invention of what became EPA’s Prevention of Significant Deterior–
ation program due to Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus;18 the famous debate
over the proper scope of judicial review between Judge Bazelon and
Judge Harold Leventhal in their concurring opinions in Ethyl Corp–
oration v. EPA;19 and the invalidation of new source performance
standards for cement plants in Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,20
among other examples.21 Especially with respect to litigation at the
D.C. Circuit, where most challenges to EPA rules have historically been
filed,22 litigation has often amounted simply to a second round of the
rulemaking process—and, according to some observers, a politicized one
at that.23
16.

Melnick, supra note 15, at 5, 9–13. For the classic account of this “new
administrative law,” see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 (1975).

17.

Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

18.

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), upheld by an
equally divided Supreme Court, sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541
(1973).

19.

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., ‘History Belongs to the Winners’: The BazelonLeventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance
Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 995
(2006).

20.

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

21.

See Melnick, supra note 15, at 21–22 & tbl. 1-1 (collecting early cases).

22.

Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and
Bargaining in the Administrative Process 91 (1994) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with authors). This trend
results from the high number of special venue statutes in environmental
laws that require certain kinds of rulemaking challenges to be filed in the
D.C. Circuit. For example, the Clean Air Act specifies that any number
of rulemaking actions under the Act “may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b); see also infra note 52 and accompanying text.

23.

See, e.g., Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 13, at 255 (arguing that
“judicial review of agency decisionmaking is necessarily premised on a set
of contestable assumptions” and that “correlating politics and law
provides the best explanation for why judicial doctrine has changed”);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997) (finding evidence of strategic
ideological voting on the D.C. Circuit in environmental cases); William
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Starting in the mid- to late-1980s, the view began to take hold that
EPA was an agency besieged by intrusive litigation. Scholars came to
accept that nearly every EPA regulation was subjected to legal
challenge in the courts.24 By the 1990s, the claim that 80 percent of
EPA rules ended up in court—a claim originally put forward publicly
by EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus25—had “woven its way
into an exhaustive body of work by journalists, government officials,
and scholars.”26 This claim continues to be propagated.27
E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact
of Appointments to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff.
L. Rev. 669 (1991) (analyzing the votes of Reagan appointees to the
courts in environmental cases and finding evidence of ideological voting);
but see William S. Jordan, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the
Administrative State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of
EPA Rules, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 45, 48 (2001) (reporting results that
“contrast sharply with various studies finding a significant degree of
ideological, partisan voting on the D.C. Circuit”).
24.

For a seven-page list of references to books, articles, and reports making
this assertion, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise
and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255, 1343–
1349 (1997) (Appendix D).

25.

See, e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief
History of the Environmental Movement in America and the Implications
Abroad, 15 Envtl. L. 455, 463 (1984–85) (“Eighty percent of what the
agency does is finally decided either in a negotiated or formal court
decision.”).

26.

Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1296. To illustrate the widespread
endorsement of the 80 percent litigation claim, consider that it was accepted
and repeated by some of the most highly respected judges, legal scholars,
and political scientists in the United States. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald,
Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the
Problem, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 621, 624 (1994) (“Eighty percent of all major
Environmental Protection Agency . . . rules are litigated in court.”);
Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991,
at 311, 324 (stating that EPA “has had 80 to 85 percent of its major
regulations challenged in court”); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy:
What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 284 (1989)
(“Over 80 percent of the three hundred or so regulations EPA issues each
year wind up in the courts.”).

27.

See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749 (2007) (seeking to support the claim that
“[m]ajor policy decisions…rarely evade judicial challenge in many areas”
with quotations from other scholars about an 80 to 85 percent litigation
rate for certain EPA actions); Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good
Grief!, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 695, 701 n. 28 (2007) (“Former EPA Administrator
William Ruckelshaus has estimated that almost 80% of the agency’s major
rules were challenged while he was Administrator. . .”); Dorit Rubinstein
Reiss, Account Me In: Agencies in Quest of Accountability, 19 J.L. & Pol’y
611, 656 (2011) (“One source estimated that in the 1980s, about 80
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The belief that almost all EPA rules are challenged has reinforced
a common refrain raised by administrative law scholars about the
ossification of administrative rulemaking.28 On this view, agencies’
notice-and-comment rulemaking process became bogged down as courts
supposedly ramped up their scrutiny of agency decisions. At some
agencies, the number of rulemaking proceedings purportedly declined
as agency officials have grown extremely cautious about having their
rules challenged in court.29 The concern about excessive or
unpredictable judicial scrutiny has led some legal scholars and judges
to urge procedural reforms that they have hoped would reduce the
amount of litigation over agency rules.30
percent of the EPA’s rules were subject to litigation, and described the
EPA as ‘embattled and embroiled in litigation, threats of litigation and
expressions of general dissatisfaction on the part of all of its outside
constituencies—industry, environmentalists, and state government.’”); Linda
Tsang & Alexandra M. Wyatt, Key Historical Court Decisions Shaping
EPA’s Program Under the Clean Air Act, Cong. Res. Serv., at 1 (Feb.
16, 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43699.pdf (“[A]lmost
every major EPA rule has been challenged in court.”); Robinson Meyer, How
the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to Trump, The Atlantic
(Mar. 29, 2017), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guidepruitt-trump/521001/ (“Why does [the regulatory process] take so long?
Because the agency knows it will get sued later.”); Robinson Meyer, ‘We
Knew They Had Cooked the Books’, The Atlantic (Feb. 12, 2020),
available at https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/02/aninside-account-of-trumps-fuel-economy-debacle/606346/ [https://perma.cc/
AM4X-VJWK] (noting that “seemingly every company fights new EPA
regulations in court . . . .”).
28.

Indeed, the origin of the term “ossification” in this context is attributed
to Don Elliott, who was, at the time of this coinage, serving as EPA’s
General Counsel and delivering remarks at a symposium organized in
commemoration of the agency’s twentieth anniversary. Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
Duke L. J. 1385–1386 (1992). For related discussion, see Stephen M.
Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking
from 2001-2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767, 768–70 (2008) (reviewing claims about
ossification at EPA).

29.

Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety
(1990); McGarity, supra note 28; Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and
the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 525 (1997).

30.

Some proposals would modify principles of judicial review. See, e.g., Kent
Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 61 (2015) (urging
Congress to “prevent ossification by constricting judicial review for purely
discretionary decisions, agency actions that are highly likely to be
products of proper agency decisionmaking, or regulatory issues that are
more likely to face regular and significant changing conditions”). Others
would change how agencies make rules. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck &
Steven Kochevar, Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform,
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These diagnoses of an ossification malady, along with proposals for
its cure, were generally grounded in case studies, anecdotes, and the
occasional assertion of a generalized pattern of administrative and
judicial behavior—such as Ruckelshaus’s claim of an 80 percent
litigation rate for EPA rules. Yet Ruckelshaus’s claim itself was never
based on any systematic data analysis—rather, it was a back-of-theenvelope hunch.31 Still, it is not difficult to understand why such a claim
could be so widely believed. Court decisions involving EPA rules have
made their mark on U.S. law. EPA has been a party in over 40 Supreme
Court decisions over the last fifty years.32 In addition, when the
Supreme Court in 2016 took the unprecedented step to reject a lower
court’s refusal to stay the effectiveness of a federal regulation pending
litigation, it did so in a case involving the review of an EPA rule.33
15 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 417, 438 (2014) (discussing an
alternative to standard notice-and-comment rulemaking called negotiated
rulemaking and urging its consideration as an antidote “to an increasingly
ossified regulatory state”).
31.

Coglianese, supra note 22, at 85–92 (noting that “staff members
indicated that the 80 percent statistic was little more than an educated
guess”).

32.

We list 43 cases in the Appendix to this Article. The list includes any case
resulting in a Supreme Court opinion in which EPA was named as a party.
It includes those cases where the United States formally was the party in
lawsuits clearly prompted by EPA action, such as indicated by having
EPA attorneys participate in the briefing. Not all these cases involved
petitions for judicial review of an EPA rulemaking; some include appeals
of environmental enforcement actions. The list does not include other
Supreme Court decisions where, although EPA was not formally a party
to the litigation, the agency’s regulatory authority nevertheless formed a
key backdrop to the litigation. See, e.g., County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 597 (2013); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). It also does not include cases
such as PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700 (1994), where the Court addressed a challenge to a state
agency decision made pursuant to an EPA-approved state regulatory
program. Nor does it include cases such as John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008), which involved issues only
tangentially related to EPA action (in that case, a takings claim against
the federal government stemming from EPA remediation activities).
Finally, it does not include Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), which
did not result in an opinion because an equally divided Court affirmed the
judgment of the D.C. Circuit. Notably, the cases in the Appendix were
not evenly divided over time. In fact, about two-thirds of these Supreme
Court decisions were handed down within the first half of EPA’s existence.

33.

See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/020916zr_21p3.pdf.
See generally Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Whither the Regulatory
‘War on Coal’?: Scapegoats, Saviors, and Stock Market Reactions, 47
Ecology L.Q. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors).
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When compared with a variety of other federal agencies, EPA is
mentioned more frequently by name in appellate court opinions than
are other major agencies. Figure 1 shows how other agencies stack up
to EPA in terms of these mentions in U.S. Court of Appeals decisions.34
EPA has been mentioned in over 60 appellate court opinions per year
of its existence, which is about 50 percent more mentions than the U.S.
Food & Drug Administration (FDA) has received and roughly three
times more mentions than most of the other agencies in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Mentions of Selected Federal
Agencies in U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions

Figure 1 may also understate the influence that EPA-related cases
have had in federal administrative law jurisprudence. It only includes
instances where an agency’s name appeared in some fashion in federal
court opinions (e.g., in the body of the opinion, in a footnote, or in a
citation to caselaw), which means it does not include mentions of cases,
34.

We computed, and report in Figure 1, the “net mentions” of the respective
agencies’ names. We first searched the entire Westlaw federal court of
appeals database for any reference at all to each of the agencies’ names
(using both full names and their acronyms). Then we searched for cases
in which the agency was a party by conducting the same search restricted
to the “title” of the case (including the full caption). We then subtracted
the latter measure from the former to find those instances in which courts
cited to each agency in cases other than those in which the agency was a
party. These net mentions were then divided by the number of years since
the agency was founded.
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such as Chevron v. NRDC, which involved the review of EPA rules but
lack the agency’s name in case citations. Chevron v. NRDC is widely
recognized as the most frequently cited administrative law decision of
all time,35 garnering more than 14,000 citations in federal court decisions
since the case was decided in 1984.36 By way of comparison, Figure 2
shows how many annual references other prominent administrative law
decisions have received in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the federal
district courts.37 Consistent with the view that court decisions involving
EPA rules have figured prominently in federal administrative law, we
note that not only do citation rates to Chevron dwarf those of the other
listed cases, but that three of the twelve prominent administrative law
decisions in Figure 2 involved EPA.
Figure 2: Federal Court Citations to
Prominent Administrative Law Decisions

35.

Cf. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 824 n.2
(2006).

36.

As of July 24, 2020, a search in Westlaw for federal district and appellate
cases citing Chevron turned up 14,351 search results.

37.

We make no claim that Figure 2 contains a representative sample of all
of the Supreme Court’s administrative law decisions, nor necessarily
includes every possible candidate for a “canonical” administrative law
decision. Other legal scholars might choose a somewhat different set of
twelve prominent administrative law decisions, but we suspect most
administrative law scholars would include many of these twelve cases if
asked for a list of the twelve most significant administrative law decisions
by the Supreme Court. For each case listed in Figure 2, we have computed
a normalized citation rate based on the amount of time elapsed since the
Court handed down its decision.
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Beyond these legal indicators of EPA’s place within the
administrative law canon, patterns of media coverage undoubtedly have
reinforced the belief that EPA rules nearly always elicit legal challenge.
Although relatively few EPA rules receive coverage in the media, those
that do are ones that appear more prone to conflict and litigation.38
Recent efforts by the Trump Administration to modify or rescind
Obama-era environmental regulations, for example, have garnered
considerable media attention—including to lawsuits filed or even
threatened against these deregulatory measures.39 Earthjustice, an
environmental organization, brags that it alone “has filed more than a
hundred lawsuits” against the Trump Administration.40 And,
continuing a trend from the Obama years, state attorneys general have
become active litigants in opposition to administration initiatives,41
most recently joining in a challenge to EPA’s rollback of tailpipe
emission standards.42

II. Reality Check: Empirical Studies
of EPA Rule Challenges
Despite a plethora of anecdotes and a widely cited hunch about the
frequency of legal challenges to EPA rules, what can be said
systematically about litigation over EPA rules? Over the past several
decades, a number of legal scholars and social scientists have taken up
the call for the quantitative study of environmental regulation,
permitting a better basis for empirical conclusions about the nature of
litigation challenging EPA rules.
38.

See Cary Coglianese & Margaret Howard, Getting the Message Out:
Regulatory Policy and the Press, 3 Harv. Int’l J. of Press/Pol. 39,
45 (1998) (studying press coverage of EPA regulatory actions and finding
that “[a]bout two-thirds of the stories on regulatory policy emphasized
conflict of some kind”).

39.

See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, States Sue to Block Trump From Weakening
Fuel Economy Rules, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2020), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/climate/lawsuit-fuel-economy-climate.html;
Rebecca Beitsch, More Than 70 Lawmakers Join Suit Challenging Trump
Power Plant Rollbacks, The Hill (Apr. 27, 2020), available at https://
thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/494803-more-than-70-lawmakersjoin-suit-challenging-trump-power-plant.

40.

Earthjustice (Jul. 20, 2020), https://earthjustice.org/features/
environmental-lawsuits-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/MX6S4HKC].

41.

See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law
Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 Tex. L. Rev 43 (2018).

42.

See California and 22 Other States Take Trump Administration to Court
over Vehicle Emissions Rollback, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (May 27, 2020), available
at https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-and-22-other-states-take-trumpadministration-court-over-vehicle-emissions-rollback.
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The earliest relevant social science research dates to the 1980s, but
that research tended to rely on the case-study method, as exemplified
by Melnick’s acclaimed narrative about the courts and the Clean Air
Act.43 Rosemary O’Leary’s important book, Environmental Change:
Federal Courts and the EPA, swept more broadly by including cases
involving EPA rules under other statutes, such as the Clean Water Act
and hazardous waste and toxic substances laws.44 But it too was limited
largely to reporting a modest number of detailed case studies. Lettie
McSpadden Wenner’s 1982 book, The Environmental Decade in Court,
did include some quantification, but her analysis focused on published
court decisions of all types of environmental cases—not just those
involving EPA—and she never broke down her data by agency or type
of claim.45
It was not until the early 1990s that researchers started, in a more
systematic fashion, to pull back the curtains on litigation challenging
EPA rules. Their work has provided valuable empirical evidence on two
important issues: (1) the rate at which EPA rules have been challenged
in court, and (2) how often these challenges have succeeded. Although
the studies that report findings on each of these issues span different
time periods within EPA’s history and rely on different samples of rules
and even case types, their findings tend to reinforce one another. In this
Part, we not only synthesize these various studies’ snapshots, but we
also provide new data that spans EPA’s fifty-year interaction with the
courts. These new data tend to validate what the different snapshots
show by revealing a considerable constancy to the association between
EPA rules and appellate court decisions involving the agency. On the
whole, the findings we present stand in contrast to the conventional
account and show an agency that has not been nearly as besieged by
litigation as has often been perceived.
A. The Frequency of Litigation

Although Ruckelshaus’s claim about the litigation of 80 percent of
EPA’s rules came into public view around 1984,46 it took nearly ten
years before anyone attempted to confirm it. In the interim, dozens of
scholars accepted the claim at face value.47 Of course, seeking to confirm
the statistic was no straightforward task. After all, Ruckelshaus was
43.

Melnick, supra note 15.

44.

Rosemary O’Leary, Environmental Change: Federal Courts and
the EPA (1993).

45.

Lettie M. Wenner, The Environmental Decade in Court (1982).

46.

Philip Shabecoff, EPA Drifts in Stalemate, N.Y. Times (Nov. 23, 1984),
at A23 (stating that “the environmental agency's Administrator, William
D. Ruckelshaus, recently noted that 80 percent of all rules issued by his
agency were now challenged in court”).

47.

See supra note 24.
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not claiming that the courts reviewed 80 percent of EPA rules—
something that could be checked by comparing published rules and
published court decisions. Rather, he claimed that 80 percent of the
agency’s rules were challenged. Presumably only the agency could easily
know the challenge rate since it was both the issuer of its rules and the
recipient of any court petitions seeking judicial review of them. What
was needed was a way for an outside researcher to compute the
underlying rate of legal challenge: that is, petitions for review divided
by the number of rules.
In principle, the number of rules is not hard to determine, as rules
are published in the Federal Register. But petitions for review are filed
in individual courthouses and they do not get published in any central
source. Petitions reside either in files within the agency’s lawyers’ offices
or in the dockets maintained in the clerks’ offices of individual
courthouses around the country.
The pre-enforcement nature of judicial review does provide at least
one advantage to the researcher: some of the major environmental
statutes dictate that petitions for judicial review of EPA rules must be
filed within a fixed period of time—usually a couple of months—
following the issuance of a final rule.48 For the researcher, this
jurisdictional limitation provides assurance that any challenges that
could have occurred have in fact occurred. The only difficulty is finding
evidence of those challenges having been filed.
A 1994 study by one of the authors of this article was the first to
make use of both agency and court records to measure systematically
EPA’s challenge rate.49 Records from EPA’s internal defensive docket
indicated the number of legal petitions filed in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals from 1987 to 1991, a period during which Ruckelshaus and
numerous scholars repeated the 80 percent rate.50 These litigation
records, when compared with data on agency rules, showed that the
rate of rulemaking challenges against EPA was not even close to 80
percent; at most, it was only 26 percent.51 Additional investigation used
48.

See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (petitions must be filed within
60 days of the final rule); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6976 (petitions must be filed within 90 days of the final rule);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S. Code § 1369 (petitions must be filed within 120
days of the final rule); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S. Code § 9613 (petitions must be
filed within 90 days of the final rule); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.
Code § 300j–7 (petitions must be filed within 45 days of the final rule).

49.

See Coglianese, supra note 22.

50.

Challenges to rules issued under the major environmental statutes must
be filed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the district courts. See supra
note 48.

51.

See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1298. Depending on the digital source
and search used for tallying up the annual number of EPA rules, the rate
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court records from the D.C. Circuit clerk’s office to assess the litigation
rate for just the more significant EPA rules issued from 1980-1991 under
the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)—two statutes which dictate that venue for review of such
significant rules lies in the D.C. Circuit.52 The litigation rate for these
more significant rules was higher—35 percent for rules listed in the
agency’s regulatory agenda, and 57 percent for rules classified as
“major” under Executive Order 12,291.53
In the years since this original study, research by several legal
scholars has confirmed that the overall rate is considerably lower than
80 percent. The rates reported in other studies vary, as they cover
somewhat different time periods and rely on different data sources. But
in general, they coalesce in the sense that they indicate, for most types
of rules, a much lower rate of legal challenge than had been widely
supposed. Christopher Schroeder and Robert Glicksman, for example,
reported a 4 percent rate from 1991-1999 based on their review of
released court decisions.54 Stephen Johnson reported a rate of 41 percent
for EPA rules that were issued from 2001-2005 and were classified as
“significant” under Executive Order 12,866.55 Wendy Wagner,
Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters found that only 13 percent of EPA’s
air toxics rules from 1990-2010 had been challenged in court.56 The
results of these various studies are summarized in Table 1.
Taken together, the empirical research indicates that, even though
EPA finds itself in court more often than your average Joe,57 throughout
much of the agency’s history the vast majority of its rules have never

during that time period was estimated to be as low as 19 percent.
Coglianese, supra note 22, at 94.
52.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607; Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976.

53.

Coglianese, supra note 22, at 94.

54.

Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and
EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,371
(2001).

55.

Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of
EPA Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767 (2008).

56.

Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63
Admin. L. Rev. 99 (2011).

57.

However, unlike with the average Joe, the handling of litigation has been
sufficiently routinized at EPA that agency staff sometimes do not even
realize that rules they have worked on have been challenged in court. See
Cary Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance
in the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & Soc’y Rev. 735, 762 (1996).
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been subjected to a petition for judicial review.58 Of course, even with
the different time periods covered in these studies, when they are
combined they span only three of EPA’s five decades—from 1980 to
2010. That led us to ask: Might it be possible to assess whether the
findings from these studies hold across the sweep of EPA’s entire
history?
Table 1: Rate of Legal Challenges to EPA Rules59

58.

As the data in Table 1 from the Coglianese and Johnson studies make
plain, the litigation rate does increase as the set of rules is narrowed to
subsets of the most significant rules. Although at times Ruckelshaus and
others made the 80 percent claim about all EPA rules, the staff who gave
Ruckelshaus this estimate said that it was based on the number of rules
appearing in the agency’s semi-annual regulatory agenda—a subset of all
EPA rules with a litigation rate of 35 percent, as indicated in the
Coglianese study. The narrowest category of rules—those which impose
$100 million or more in economic costs—has the highest litigation rate.
Although the rate of litigation for this smallest subset comprising the most
significant EPA rules comes closest to 80 percent in the Johnson study, it
is clear that this is not the category of EPA rules that Ruckelshaus and
others included in their claim. In addition, his sample of rules derives from
five years during the 2000s, which is long after the time when Ruckelshaus
and others were making their claims. The data from the Coglianese study
were contemporaneous to those claims and show only a 57 percent
litigation rate for these most significant rules.

59.

The studies listed in Table 1 are as follows: Coglianese, supra note 22;
Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 54; Johnson, supra note 28; Wendy
Wagner, Katherine Barnes, & Lisa Peters, supra note 56. Beyond the
studies summarized in Table 1, we note that occasional glimpses of
litigation rates can be found in other studies. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner,
Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An
Empirical Investigation, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1717, 1745, 1791
(2012) (finding that seven out of ninety hazardous-air-pollution rules were
litigated to judgment); Coglianese, supra note 57, at 743 (reporting that
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Seeking to determine whether existing research might be effectively
validated across the entirety of the last fifty years, we conducted our
own original data collection to situate existing studies’ snapshots within
a longer timeframe. We began by first collecting annual data on the
number of final rules that EPA published in the Federal Register across
its fifty-year history—itself a first such effort in the literature, as far as
we are aware.60 We then collected annual data on decisions of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals in which EPA was a party.61 Figure 3 reflects data
from 1970–2019 on both the annual number of EPA rules and the
annual number of reported decisions from appeals courts in which EPA
was a named party.
Following 1970 (which lasted less than a month for EPA, as the
agency only started operating in December 1970), the number of court
decisions involving EPA never came close to matching the production
of agency rules. This disparity is remarkably stable over time. An
alternative way of viewing these data can be found in Figure 4, which
simply shows a ratio computed by dividing the annual number of
appellate decisions by the annual number of EPA rules. Using this ratio,
the relationship between rules and appellate decisions can be examined
on a finer-grained scale, and some fluctuation is evident—but it is
46 percent of “significant” and “major” Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act rules issued between 1988 and 1990 were challenged). These
studies follow the courts in treating multiple petitions against an EPA
rule as a single “challenge,” as such petitions are almost always, if not
always, consolidated into a single case.
60.

Data on EPA rules were obtained by searching each year in Westlaw’s
Federal Register database using the following search (with dates adjusted
annually): advanced: DATE(aft 12-31-1969 & bef 1-1-1971) & PR(agency
/5 “environmental protection”) & PR(action /5 (“final rule” or “final
rulemaking”)) % PR(action /5 (“technical amendment” or “correction”
or “clarification”)). As a check on our search results’ validity for EPA’s
first decade, prior to the initial development of electronic databases of
legal sources, we compared our search results with a manual review of
collections of EPA documents in the Federal Register obtained both
through Lexis and Westlaw using much broader searches. The results were
sufficiently aligned to give us confidence in the Westlaw search results
that we report in Figure 3.

61.

Data on court cases also come from Westlaw searches. We searched each
year in the U.S. Courts of Appeals database using the following search
(with dates adjusted annually): advanced: DATE (aft 12-31-1969 & bef
01-01-1971) & TI(EPA “Environmental Protection Agency” E.P.A.).
These data undoubtedly have some noise to them, as they include some
appeals from cases having nothing to do with EPA rules, but we have no
reason to think there is any systematic bias in that noise. We also checked
to confirm that we were not missing rule challenges in district court
decisions by manually reviewing all EPA cases found in the district court
database in Westlaw for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. We found very few
rulemaking challenges, as would be expected, given that jurisdiction for
petitions for review under most of the major environmental statutes
generally rests with the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
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fluctuation with a rather tight band that still reflects a paucity of
litigation relative to the number of EPA rules.
Throughout most of the agency’s history, the annual number of
appellate decisions ranged between about 5 percent to 15 percent of
annual rules. Although the ratio was slightly higher in EPA’s first 25
years (10.8 percent) than in its most recent 25 years (9.8 percent), the
difference is not statistically significant. The pattern shown in Figure 4
also remains substantially the same even if appellate decisions are
lagged by one year or two years. This lack of difference between the
first half of EPA’s history and its second supports Judge Wald’s
suggestion of considerable continuity in the courts’ “uneasy
partnership” over the decades, while it stands in tension with Judge
Bazelon’s prediction of a tapering off in the importance of litigation
over time.62
Figure 3: EPA Final Rules and Appellate Decisions, 1970–2019

62.

See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text. It is possible, of course, that
any tapering off in frequency has been counteracted by a growth in the
significance of environmental litigation as legislative policy avenues have
been shut down due to gridlock. See Christopher McGrory Klyza &
David J. Sousa, American Environmental Policy: Beyond Gridlock
141–178 (2013).

1023

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
Litigating EPA Rules

Figure 4: Ratio of Appellate Decisions to Final Rules, 1970–2019

Of course, the litigation data in Figures 3 and 4 draw from decided
EPA appeals, not petitions for review, so they do not directly measure
the filing of litigation over EPA rules. In this regard, it must be
recognized that these data, like almost any data, have some noise. On
the one hand, they include a potentially substantial number of appellate
decisions in EPA cases other than those centered on petitions for
judicial review of agency rules.63 On the other hand, they also do not
include all rule challenges, as many petitions for review are dismissed
or settled and thus never result in an adjudicated decision by an
appeals-court panel.64 We have no reason to believe, though, that these
63.

One study indicates that no more than a third of appellate court decisions
in EPA cases actually deal with rulemaking. Schroeder & Glicksman,
supra note 54, at 10,372.

64.

Petitions for review can result in a wide range of possible outcomes other
than reported appellate decisions. They can be held in abeyance pending
further action by the agency, dismissed by the court preliminarily on
jurisdictional grounds, sent to another court, or simply left to languish on
the docket without any outcome at all for some period of time. In addition,
as with other litigation, settlement negotiations might also lead the
petitioner voluntarily to dismiss the petition. In the D.C. Circuit in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, about 47 percent of petitions for review
challenging EPA rules were ultimately dismissed voluntarily. Coglianese,
supra note 57, at 756.
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countervailing factors have varied substantially and systematically
across the past fifty years. It appears from the data that the courts and
the Agency have largely existed in equilibrium, with the rate of rulesto-decisions remaining consistently low across the entire sweep of the
agency’s history, as would be expected from the existing research. The
once widely held view of an EPA beleaguered by nearly certain rule
challenges is not borne out by the empirical evidence.
B. Success Rates

The view of an agency besieged by litigation is also not borne out
by how litigants actually fare when they do challenge an EPA rule.
These litigants, it should be noted, comprise a mix of environmental
groups, industry litigants, and, increasingly it seems, state governments. Just as Judge Wald emphasized the early use of litigation by
public interest advocacy groups,65 researchers have recognized that from
the agency’s earliest days it “has had to deal with as many complaints
and lawsuits from environmentalists as from industry, despite the
economic and political advantages industry presumably enjoys.”66 Over
time, though, it appears that “industry gradually increased its demands
on courts.”67 Among the major RCRA rule challenges filed from 1988–
1990, 91 percent of the unique litigants in the sample were corporations
or trade associations, while only 8 percent were environmental
organizations.68 Among challenges to air toxics standards between
1990–2010, 42 percent were filed by industry alone, 25 percent by
environmental groups alone, and 33 percent by both simultaneously.69
Ultimately, we would expect that litigants of any kind will act
rationally and make decisions about whether to go to court based on
whether they can expect to win.70 It is not nearly as expensive to litigate
EPA rules as it is to pursue much civil litigation that involves discovery,
65.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also Wagner, supra note 59,
at 1726–29 (noting the view that in the “early reformation period, public
interest groups seemed to emerge from the woodwork to defend the rights
of the diffuse public against capture and other lapses in agency
judgment”); Lettie McSpadden Wenner, The Reagan Era in Environmental
Regulation, in Conflict Resolution and Public Policy 43, 45–46
(Mills ed. 1990) (observing active use of litigation by public interest
groups across different kinds of environmental issues).

66.

James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in The Politics of
Regulation 357, 385 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).

67.

Wenner, supra note 65, at 47.

68.

Coglianese, supra note 22, at 101.

69.

Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 56, at 135. A study of Chevron
cases also found a mix of environmental and industry litigants. Stephen
M. Johnson, The Brand-X Effect: Declining Chevron Deference in the
21st Century, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (2018).

70.

Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 54, at 10,374.
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but it is also not costless either. As a result, the relatively low rate at
which rules are challenged in court suggests that expected returns may
not be all that substantial. When researchers have looked at the
outcomes of EPA rule challenges, they have found that the agency is
very likely to succeed.71
Table 2 presents the key findings on EPA’s success in adjudicated
cases. Almost all studies have found that EPA is more likely to succeed
than the challenger. Those that focus on total wins (i.e., cases in which
EPA prevailed on all of the issues presented to the court) tend to find
that EPA achieved this overall outcome at least half the time. Other
studies proceed issue by issue, recognizing that one petition might raise
multiple objections, and these issue-focused studies generally find an
even higher win rate—nearly 70 percent in cases involving the
application of Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretations of
statutes. Still other studies, as shown in Table 2, have collected data
on judges’ votes—the clear majority of which are to affirm EPA’s
actions or interpretations.
On the whole, the evidence indicates that EPA does reasonably well
in defending its rules in court. In this respect, it is not unlike other
federal agencies, which also “enjoy considerable litigation success.”72
EPA’s success is all the more apparent once it is recognized that, even
when EPA or another agency formally loses a case, the court’s remedy
is usually to remand the rule to the agency to cure its deficiencies—
meaning that the agency is able to recover from a loss in relatively short
order.73
71.

In this respect, EPA is not unlike the government more generally. See
Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant
Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 Fl. St. U. L. Rev. 391 (2000).

72.

Robert J. Hume, How Courts Impact Federal Administrative
Behavior 19 (2009).

73.

The studies in Table 2 on the next page are: Coglianese, supra note 22;
Jonathan H. Adler, No Intelligible Principles: The EPA’s Record in
Federal Court, Reason (2000), available at https://reason.org/policystudy/no-intelligible-principles/ [https://perma.cc/9Z35-6LKU]; Schroeder &
Glicksman, supra note 54; William S. Jordan, Judges, Ideology, and
Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look
Remands of EPA Rules, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 45 (2001); Joseph L. Smith &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative
Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 61 (2002); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical
Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and
the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 767
(2008); John A. Sautter & Levente Littvay, Environmental Judicial
Interpretation and Agency Review: An Empirical Investigation of Judicial
Decision-Making in the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, 19 Buff.
Envtl. L.J. 269 (2012); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron
in the Circuit Courts, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2017); Stephen M. Johnson,
The Brand-X Effect: Declining Chevron Deference in the 21st Century, 69
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 65 (2018). The studies in Table 2 include more
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Table 2: EPA Success in Rule Challenges

In a study that included EPA and other agencies’ rule challenges,
legal scholar Bill Jordan studied the sixty-one times from 1985–1995
that the D.C. Circuit remanded an agency’s rules back to the agency.74
He concluded that the typical remedy of remand “did not significantly
impede agencies in the pursuit of their policy goals.” 75 Indeed, “[w]hen
rules were remanded, agencies tended to recover fairly quickly when
than a handful or two of cases involving EPA rules; the literature does
contain other work that presents success rates but for smaller samples or
only sets of case studies. What counts as a “win” in Table 2 follows from
the definitions provided by each study’s authors, but where an author
separated challenger losses on jurisdictional grounds from those on the
merits, we have combined these together in reporting an EPA win rate.
74.

William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve
Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 393,
396 (2000).

75.

Id.
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recovery was necessary.”76 Jordan found that, after the conclusion of
litigation, agencies “successfully implemented their policies in
approximately 80% of the instances in which courts have originally
remanded rules as arbitrary and capricious.”77
This picture of considerable agency success stems from the
judgments made by courts and how agencies respond to them; it does
not take into account the frequent outcomes achieved through
settlement. Yet “settlement negotiations are a routine part of judicial
review litigation challenging EPA rules.”78 For significant RCRA and
Clean Air Act rules issued between 1980 and 1990 and challenged in
court, less than half ever resulted in a decision of any kind by a court.
The most frequent resolution of a petition for review has been for the
petitioner to withdraw it voluntarily. The litigation process is thus not
infrequently just another round of negotiations—not the kind of
adversarial and intrusive inquisition that the prospect of “getting sued”
typically implies in everyday settings.79
In recent years, some observers have even claimed that officials at
EPA and other agencies have used the secrecy of settlement
negotiations to their advantage. A phenomenon often referred to as “sue
and settle” posits that agency-friendly groups sue EPA so as to use
secret settlement negotiations to set regulatory policies that would not
survive scrutiny in more public fora.80 Regardless of how frequently any
such collusive strategies might occur, the possibility only reinforces the

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 440. Of note, Wendy Wagner’s study of EPA’s hazardous air
pollutant rules came to a similar conclusion, suggesting that what can
look like major victories for environmental groups on paper turn out to
be largely empty hopes after EPA simply ignored or otherwise
circumvented the courts’ orders. Wagner, supra note 59, at 1750.

78.

Coglianese, supra note 57, at 756; see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal
Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 Geo. L.J. 1241, 1254 (1985).

79.

This is a core finding in Coglianese, supra note 57.

80.

See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak,
Regulation by Litigation (2009); Ben Tyson, An Empirical Analysis
of Sue and Settle in Environmental Litigation, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1545
(2014); Stephen M. Johnson, Sue and Settle: Demonizing the
Environmental Citizen Suit, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 891 (2014); The
Debate Over “Sue-and-Settle” Legislation, Reg. Rev. (May 18, 2015),
available at https://www.theregreview.org/2015/05/18/sue-and-settle/
[https://perma.cc/E7KY-MBQM] (featuring an exchange between Dan
Walters and James Conrad over the frequency and undesirability of
settlement in the context of agency rulemaking); Travis A. Voyles,
Clearing Up Perceived Problems with the Sue-and-Settle Issue in
Environmental Litigation, 31 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 287 (2016). Such
a strategy of “friendly” litigation over agency policies is far from new. See
Susan M. Olson, Clients and Lawyers: Securing the Rights of
Disabled Persons (1984).
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conclusion that EPA need not find the experience of getting sued to be
antithetical to its goals.
Of course, EPA can and does at times lose in a very visible
fashion. Recent years have seen the agency experience certain judicial
setbacks over its Obama-era Clean Power Plan,81 a mercury air toxics
standard,82 and a rule defining the scope of the Clean Water Act,83
among other examples. But when considered more broadly—taking into
account EPA’s generally high win rate in adjudicated cases, its ability
to achieve its goals on remand even after formally losing a case, and its
ability to work collaboratively with outside groups through
settlement—it is clear that the agency has much less to fear from
potential petitions for review than has been often suggested.

III. Implications: The Courts and EPA’s
Internal Processes
The empirical evidence presented here on EPA rule challenges over
the last fifty years reveals a much less intrusive role for judicial review
than implied by the dire claims of those legal scholars who have
contributed to the ossification literature.84 The fact that litigation rates
have remained low throughout the last fifty years also suggests a
relatively stable equilibrium, rather than any markedly changing or
evolving role for judicial review. To be sure, the relatively low rates of
litigation over EPA rules, combined with the agency’s strong record of
winning in court, do not deny that judicial review can be important.
On the contrary, the prospect of litigation certainly does matter for the
agency’s most controversial rules, and, as indicated in Part I, litigation
over EPA rules has at times resulted in outcomes that have had an
even broader, lasting impact on regulatory law. Moreover, judicial
81.

Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s
Clean Power Plan, Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supremecourt-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/
PY9K-U53S].

82.

Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).

83.

In re E.P.A., 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015) (staying the Waters of the
United States rule nationwide), vacated sub nom. In re United States
Dep’t of Def., 713 F. App’x 489 (6th Cir. 2018).

84.

For other research that undermines strong claims about regulatory
ossification across a range of other agencies, particularly by pointing to
the overall upward accumulation of agency rules, see Cary Coglianese,
Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1111–
1137 (2002); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev.
889 (2008); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the
Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory
Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1414 (2012).
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review litigation can shape agency behavior even if most rules are never
challenged.85 EPA staff members often act as if their rules will be
challenged, shoring up the evidentiary basis for agency decisions and
engaging in a dialogue with representatives of affected organizations
and other interested individuals to head off disputes.86 It may well be a
proper sign of the agency’s success at public engagement, regulatory
analysis, and internal legal review that the majority of the agency’s
rules have escaped legal challenge and change.
Over the last fifty years, the courts have arguably played the kind
of role in shaping EPA’s internal handling of rules that Judge Bazelon
envisioned—although it does not appear to have taken long for that
role to be established. In 1970, EPA started out as an institution
literally cobbled together with people and offices transferred from other
federal departments. Even the very litigation in which Bazelon wrote
his opinion celebrating the new era of judicial review started out as a
dispute over the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s failure to ban DDT
under the federal insecticide statute—a law for which EPA inherited
responsibility by the time the lawsuit had reached Bazelon’s bench for
a decision.87 From these humble beginnings, EPA has developed a
rulemaking process that, even if still not perfect, has at least become
routinized, professional, and robust.88
For fifty years, across both Democratic and Republican
administrations, EPA has issued hundreds of rules annually. 89 On a
consistent basis, the agency’s rules have been featured in the White
House’s yearly report to Congress on the federal government’s most

85.

Even a small litigation rate—perhaps even as little as 10 to 20 percent—
could certainly be enough to make an agency sit up and take note of what
the courts do. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 773.

86.

Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1332 (noting how “public managers appear
much more adept than ordinarily assumed at anticipating interests and
managing conflict in the normal rulemaking process”); Daniel E. Walters,
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effects on
Agency Rules, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 85, 159 (2019) (observing that
“[a]gencies that write a lot of rules have generally invested in an
institutional infrastructure that helps them facilitate a response to the
prospect of judicial review”).

87.

Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

88.

See Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54
L. & Contemp. Probs. 57, 59 (1991) (observing that EPA’s need to
address “complex scientific, economic, and technological issues must draw
upon so many different kinds of expertise that no individual employee can
know very much about all of the issues involved in a typical rulemaking,”
and further observing that EPA has adopted a model of “bureaucratic
pluralism” that allows it to integrate all of these varying perspectives).

89.

See supra Figure 3.
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significant regulations.90 To support such an active rulemaking agenda,
EPA has assembled a team of lawyers who deal specifically with
rulemaking, and the agency has created an in-house staff of public
engagement professionals to help solicit input when making rules. EPA
also relies on internal policy analysis produced by talented
environmental scientists and economists. Admittedly, other pressures,
such as those emanating from the White House and Congress, have
contributed to the institutionalization of EPA’s regulatory analysis and
public engagement functions. Some of this professionalization might
have been expected anyway as the agency matured. But judicial review
has almost certainly played a role, too, even if only to reinforce other
institutional factors pointing toward greater professionalization of the
rulemaking process.
Yet as much as EPA has succeeded in creating a transparent,
participatory, and analytic rulemaking process, the part of Bazelon’s
prediction that does not appear to have come to pass has been the
expectation that the development of such internal capacities and
practices would “diminish the importance of judicial review.”91
Whatever importance judicial review had in the 1970s, it appears still
to have much the same level of importance. The quantitative indicators
we have presented in this article suggest that the prospect of litigation
still looms today over EPA’s regulatory program as much as it has for
the last half century.
In Part II, we focused on observable, quantitative patterns in
litigation involving EPA. Although interesting nuances can be found in
these data and are worth exploring in future research, by and large the
picture that emerges from the accumulated evidence is one of stability.
EPA has won some and lost some when courts have reviewed its rules
over the years. But the overall risk of a rule getting challenged is modest
and the chances of the agency losing completely are not great. This
basic stability or equilibrium is perhaps all the more striking given that
the underlying statutory basis for EPA’s rulemaking has remained
largely unchanged for the last thirty years. If, as some have postulated,
making old statutes fit new circumstances creates legal risk,92 then
litigation rates presumably should have been expected to increase over
EPA’s second quarter century—but they did not.
Part of what explains the stability may be changes to legal doctrine.
When deciding whether to challenge a rule, potential litigants look to
doctrine to estimate the prospects of prevailing. It may have appeared
90.

One need only look at virtually any year’s version of OIRA’s annual report to
Congress, copies of which can be found online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/information-regulatory-affairs/reports/#ORC.

91.

Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d at 598.

92.

Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa
L. Rev. 1931 (2020); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New
Problems, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2014).
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to some observers, such as Judge Bazelon, that the courts were truly
entering a new doctrinal era in the early 1970s. But it appears that
Judge Wald had the better account in her suggestion that legal doctrine
has maintained a considerable degree of consistency—or at least it has
maintained a consistent degree of tension between judicial scrutiny and
judicial deference. This ever-present tension in effect produces flexibility
for judges, as they can impose scrutiny on some occasions, while
retreating with deference on others.
This tension does seem built into administrative law, just as Judge
Wald argued. How else can one explain the Supreme Court handing
down its high-scrutiny administrative law decision in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.93 in the very same year as it issued its high-deference administrative
law decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.?94 As Judge Wald noted, a tension seems built
into the very heart of the Chevron doctrine, which calls for high
deference at Step Two but can accommodate high scrutiny at Step One.
It is also clear that the Supreme Court can step in from time to time
to recalibrate or redirect doctrinal tendencies, such as in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council95
or Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife96—interventions which may have
helped promote stability.
Yet another factor explaining the rough equilibrium between EPA
and the courts presumably derives from the professionalization that has
occurred at EPA. The agency’s legal and policy professionals adapt to
what they see by way of changes in legal doctrine or to other signals
from the judiciary.97 They can adjust what the agency does depending
on the degree of legal risk presented by particular policy choices. Their
role, after all, is to manage the agency’s rulemaking so that legal risk
stays within certain reasonable bounds, and they appear to have been
able to do just that with some striking consistency throughout the
agency’s history. They have done so, too, without the agency retreating
from a rulemaking production schedule that has generated hundreds of
rules each year.
EPA’s experience during the first several years of the Trump
Administration appears to support the vital role played by agency
professionals in managing legal risk. Although the ratio of court
decisions to rules does not appear in recent years to be out of the typical
range for EPA, it is widely accepted that EPA has not fared well during
93.

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

94.

462 U.S. 87 (1983).

95.

435 U.S. 519 (1978).

96.

504 U.S. 555 (1992).

97.

McGarity, supra note 88, at 82 (discussing the role played by EPA lawyers
in assessing and managing legal risk).
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the Trump Administration when it comes to how courts have ruled on
the challenges that have been filed.98
No detailed assessment of litigation against EPA during the Trump
years has yet to emerge that traces specific EPA rules to lawsuits or
court outcomes, so any robust estimate of either a challenge or win rate
for the Trump Administration must await another day. But it certainly
seems instructive that, according to one organization’s website tracking
how the Trump Administration has fared in court, among 31 court
decisions reviewing EPA actions, the agency has reportedly lost in 28.99
That kind of lopsided track record contrasts dramatically with
longstanding trends.
Attorney Connor Raso has explained that many of EPA’s recent
losses derive from failures to follow proper procedure or build an
adequate record of decision: “In many of these cases, the EPA had
dispensed with procedures such as explaining its reasoning and allowing
the public an opportunity to comment.”100 Legal scholar Jonathan Adler
elaborates that the agency’s losses under President Trump have often
98.

Connor Raso, Trump’s Deregulatory Efforts Keep Losing in Court—and
the Losses Could Make it Harder for Future Administrations to Deregulate,
Brookings (Oct. 25, 2018), available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/
trumps-deregulatory-efforts-keep-losing-in-court-and-the-losses-couldmake-it-harder-for-future-administrations-to-deregulate/#footref-2 [https://
perma.cc/QTS3-RBQ3].

99.

These numbers are based on what has been reported on the website of the
New York University (NYU) Law School’s Institute of Policy Integrity:
https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup [https://perma.cc/ZGY59XUD]. The 31 judicial decisions involving EPA were out of 106 total
court decisions tracked by the Institute as of August 5, 2020. Not all of
the EPA actions on the Institute’s list involved rulemaking. Overall, the
Institute has put the Trump Administration’s win record across all of its
tracked administrative law cases at only 11 percent. As our present article
headed to print, EPA General Counsel Matthew Z. Leopold proclaimed a
much higher agency win rate—“approximately two-thirds”—for suits over
asserted “significant environmental actions.” Matthew Z. Leopold, Judicial
Wins Reduce Regulatory Burdens, Bloomberg L. (Aug. 10, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/insight-epageneral-counsel-judicial-wins-reduce-regulatory-burdens [https://perma.cc/
HS72-CNEF]. Although EPA released a list of cases, neither the agency
nor Leopold disclosed exactly how he supported his claim, and of course
his calculations could be expected to cast EPA’s litigation track record in
a better light. NYU’s Bethany Davis Noll has conceded that EPA
disclosed some cases not originally included in the NYU tracker. Ellen
M. Gilmer, EPA Touts Winning Record, but Some Attorneys Dispute
Its Numbers, Bloomberg L. (Aug. 26, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://news
.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/epa-touts-winning-recordbut-some-attorneys-dispute-its-numbers [https://perma.cc/4KZS-PQJS].
With those cases added, the NYU tracker increases EPA’s win rate during
the Trump Administration from 10 percent to 19 percent, still a stark
contrast with the rates in Table 2.

100. Raso, supra note 98.
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arisen because the agency has acted “on the fly, without taking care of
the relevant legal and procedural niceties, and got burned in court.”101
In Adler’s view, “[t]he EPA’s legal difficulties are somewhat selfcreated” because the agency has pursued too many “quick-and-dirty
deregulatory efforts.”102 He concludes that, “[i]f the Trump
administration’s environmental-policy agenda is to bloom, the EPA’s
attorneys will have to up their game.”103
Of course, for the attorneys to “up their game,” EPA leadership
must value professional staff work and manage processes so as to give
professionals the time and resources to do their jobs well. When Scott
Pruitt served as Trump’s first EPA Administrator, though, EPA civil
service staff were reportedly cut out of the decision support process and
could not do their normal work to manage legal risk.104 As a result, if
these management failures explain exceptional court losses in the
Trump Administration, they at least provide a strong endorsement of
the view that expert staff work has had something to do with the rough
equilibrium between EPA and the courts over the last half century.
In the end, quality staff work and robust internal processes appear
not to have made judicial review decline in importance, as Judge
Bazelon suggested. But at the same time, such internal efforts also
appear to have kept judicial review from increasing in importance,
apparently with the exception of the agency’s experience in the Trump
Administration. A fifty-year equilibrium of low litigation rates and high
agency win rates appears to have stemmed in good measure from the
people who have provided the leadership in the agency and from their
judgment to value solid, conscientious professional staff work.105

Conclusion
As anyone who studies or practices environmental law can attest,
judicial review has been an enduring feature of EPA’s first half-century.
The pivotal cases involving the agency are well-known: Chevron,106

101. Jonathan H. Adler, Hostile Environment, Nat’l Rev. (Sept. 27, 2018),
available at https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/15/hostileenvironment/ [https://perma.cc/K52W-4VAL].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Lisa Friedman, Eric Lipton, & Coral Davenport, Scott Pruitt’s Rocky
Relationship With His Aides Set the Stage for His Fall, N.Y. Times (July
6, 2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/climate/scottpruitt-epa-aides.html.
105. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Excellence as “People Excellence,” Reg.
Rev. (Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.theregreview.org/2015/10/23/
coglianese-people-excellence/ [https://perma.cc/57WF-BWZD].
106. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Massachusetts v. EPA,107 Michigan v. EPA,108 and more. Yet when one
looks at the data, the threat of judicial review hardly seems all that
great—at least not when EPA has done its homework. Relative to the
large volume of EPA rules issued every year, the level of legal challenges
to those rules is quite modest. Of course, EPA issues so many rules that
even if just a tiny fraction result in court rulings, this still produces
enough published court opinions to keep environmental lawyers busy.
But as a function of all that the agency does, litigation occurs less
frequently than has been often supposed, and EPA ends up winning
arguments more often than not. EPA hardly appears to have grown
ossified by the threat of judicial review.
This empirical retrospective on litigation over EPA rules supports
some but not all aspects of the vision that Judge Bazelon articulated
near the time of the agency’s founding. Judicial review of EPA rules
has certainly not diminished in importance, as Judge Bazelon predicted
or hoped. But this is only because judicial review’s importance appears
to have remained relatively constant, but modest, at least judging from
the demand for court action reflected in the volume of litigation over
the years. In this respect, Judge Wald’s emphasis on continuity appears
to have been borne out. That said, Judge Bazelon was surely right to
emphasize the importance of responsible leadership and management
within agencies, for this remains the frontline defense both against legal
risk and poor policy decisions. Judicial review remains an ever-present
risk should the agency fail to do its homework. That check—especially
on the most egregious cases—has played a role in the way
environmental policy has been made at the federal level over the last
fifty years.
Will such litigation, and its risk, continue along a similar path for
the next fifty years? We have no crystal ball. Much will likely depend
on how many times in the future EPA will be led by individuals willing
to accept “quick-and-dirty” staff work. Much may also depend on
whether, or how far, the Supreme Court goes in reconfiguring doctrines
that govern the administrative state. If all the Court does is overturn
Chevron, perhaps little will change.109 The best empirical evidence
indicates that the courts did not shift their deference to EPA’s
statutory interpretation decisions in any perceptible way after Chevron,
so it is hard to see that they would likely shift if Chevron is pulled

107. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
108. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
109. The Court might not even overturn Chevron. That it had a chance to overturn
Auer but did not may be telling, as Auer seemed the much more likely case to
be overturned. See Daniel E. Walters, A Turning Point in the Deference Wars,
Reg. Rev. (July 9, 2019), available at https://www.theregreview.org/2019/
07/09/walters-turning-point-deference-wars/ [https://perma.cc/V8PM74M5].
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back.110 Even in a world without Chevron, the institutional limitations
that courts face when reviewing well-supported EPA rulemakings—
their inability to second-guess the agency in any intelligent way—will
no doubt continue. The agency will, at least when led responsibly,
continue to do its homework. And so the next half-century may look
much like this first one, with courts sometimes providing a forum in
which to play out heated disputes over the most controversial rules,
and sometimes acting as a check on egregious abuses, but otherwise
presenting few obstacles that cannot be effectively managed through
robust internal processes and careful analysis.

110. See generally Smith & Tiller, supra note 73 (finding that courts “were no
more likely to defer to the EPA after Chevron than before it”).

1036

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
Litigating EPA Rules

Appendix: EPA in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1970–2020
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink
Train v. Campaign Clear Water
Train v. City of New York
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
Environmental Protection Agency v. California
Hancock v. Train
Union Elec. Co. v. Train
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train
E.P.A. v. Brown
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States
Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation
United States v. Ward
E.P.A. v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n
Middlesex Cty. Sewage Auth’y v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.
United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.
Thomas v. Sierra Club
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co.
Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S.
General Motors Corp. v. U.S.
Arkansas v. Oklahoma
United States v. Bestfoods
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations
Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A.
Rapanos v. United States
Massachusetts v. E.P.A.
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S.
Sackett v. E.P.A.
E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A.
Michigan v. E.P.A.
National Ass'n of Mfrs v. Department of Defense
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